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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

WERNER KIEPE,

Plaintiff-Appellant
and Cross Respondent,

)
Case No. 10310

vs.

ELT D. LeCHEMINANT,
Defendant-Respondent
and Cross Appellant.

•

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the judgment of the Third District Court
For Salt Lake County
Hon. Marcellus K. Snow, Judge
Defendant's Brief contains several statements which
are not only not supported by the record but are untrue,
and if not denied may be confusing to the Court in considering the matters at issue in this appeal.
POINT I
RESPONDENT PARTICIPATED IN APPELLANT'S INCOME FROM APPRAISAL BUSINESS.

At Page 8 of his brief, Respondent states:
"The fact, as shown by the record, is that
while the partners continued on in the same office,
Appellant took into his possession and under his
eontrol the appraisal business and records, claiming those assets as his own and not partnership
assets, and Appellant conducted his own inde-

pendent appraisal business. H<· did not 1·•11 ,
R
. .
.
.
f·rn1
that PS~~ondrnt part1c1pate _rn tlit- mc·o111(' tlt(·Ii·
from wl111e Respondent ear"·wd on tli(' rno1·tn·i
loan and. immrance bm;irn•ss
of ilie 1nntl'('J'.~'i
.
, , 1~!·IJI
f rom \dnch Appellant <'XlH'cted to and did at alt
ti~es partici~ate in_ the income• .inst as ]11 • rlirl
prior to the d1ssolut10n of the partner:shij 1.''
l

Respondent does not cite any page of the re~ord
support this statement.

tri

There is nothing in the record to show that "Ap]iel
lant took into his possession and under his control the
appraisal business and records, claiming thosf• a:::1;et8 a~
his own."
The fact is that Respondent participated in the income from the appraisals made hy Appellant just the
same as he had done at all times prior to January 1, 1963
(R. 63, first four lines of Paragraph 9 of the Judgment).
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT RETAIN JURISDICTION OF
THE CASE AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL TO SETTLE
THE MATTER OF DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND EXPENSES DURING THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 1, 1963 TO
FEBRUARY 1, 1964.

At the last two lines of Page 2 and at Page 3 of hi'
brief, Respondent states:
"The only question before the Court is what
is an equitable basis upon which the parties opPrated for the period of thirteen months from tl 1•1:
date of dissolution until the final breaking off
date. rrhe attention of the Court is din·ctt>d to
the fact that this phast> of the cm;e was not J1_1arl:·
an issue by the pleadings. rrhe trial court retauJPd

•_)

u

juri8dirtion after having entered its judgment on
the case, at the request of counsel, to settle the
controversy which had arisen between the parties
as to this thirteen-month period of time when the
parties could not resolve their differences. The
order from which the appeal is taken was initiated
not by any pleadings, but upon application of
Respondent for an order to show cause why Aprwllant should not be found in contempt of court
for having failed to comply with the judgment
of the Court which was made and entered on
March 12, 1964. At this hearing on Respondent's
application both parties initiated the matter of
accountings for the thirteen-month period subsequent to the date of dissolution."
Respondent cites no page or pages of the record to
support any of the misstatements above made.
question of the "equitable basis under which
the parties operated for the period of thirteen months
from the date of dissolution to the final breaking off
date" was tried by the Court and was decided on February 13, 1964 (R. 153 to R. 245). Judgment was entered
March 12, 1964, (R. 60-64). The judgment became final
thirty days thereafter.
~ he
1

The statement that "the trial court retained jurisdiction after having entered its judgment on the case
at the request of counsel to settle the controversy which
!tad arisen between the parties as to the thirteen-month
)!~rio<l of time when the parties could not resolve their
difft·rencP8" i8 wholly false, and no page of the record
i.' ,·ilt>d in 8Upport thereof. Counsel did not request the
Court to retain jurisdiction "to settle the controversy
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which had arjsen between the parties as to the tltirtel:n.
month period." As above stated, the judgment of March
12, 1964 (R. 60-64) decided all questions ronePmi'l"·
·
' h 111
come and disbursements during the thirteen-month peri
od. (R. 245 and R. 60-64). Nearly 100 pages of record
were made in presenting this matter. (R. 153-:2-1:5).
The statement that at the hearing of Jmw 13, 1%1
and June 24, 1964, which were held upon orcfors to ~lH,\\
cause directed to both Appellant and Respondent, that
"both parties initiated the matter of accounting for thP
thirteen-month period subsequent to the date of dissolution" is not true, nor is any page of the record citPd
in support thereof. It is true that at said hearing Respondent questioned some items contained in settlemr11t
statements furnished by Appellant, and in rebuttal Appellant adduced some evidence relative to services performed by Ruth Barlow and Richard Christensen and
some evidence on bonuses, but both parties did not initiate the matter of accountings. The only ruling that the
Court made upon said hearings which was ilifferent frorn
the judgment of March 12, 1964, was that "Def enda11t
LeCheminant will receive the sum of $2,500.00 for hi~
efforts and services during the last thirteen months in
preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partnPrship. ,.
Not a word of pleading was filed in this matter, nor waE
it at issue, nor was it mentioned, nor was a word of
evidence adduced thereon at said hearings. (R. 246-308).
rrhe Court did not consider that matter.
Respondent in his memorandum for the Court after

5
id Jwa rings and before the Court entered its Order for

'" 1

Judgment, started out his memorandum as follows:
'"rhe Court having designated four points to
he covered by this memorandum, Defendant will
treat these points in the following order: (1)
Compensation paid to Ruth Barlow; (2) Compensation paid to R. L. Christensen; (3) Percentage of commission to be paid producer; (4)
Contempt. (R. 84)"
As stated in Appellant's brief at Pages 19 to 22,
this issue of whether Respondent was entitled to any
compensation for "preserving the mortgage loan asset"
was decided by the judgment of March 12, 1964, and
was res adjudicata before the hearings of June 13 and
24 were held.
POINT III
RESPONDENT GAINS NO BENEFIT FROM THE FACT
THAT THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT ON THE MATTER OF SALARIES
AWARDED TO RUTH BARLOW AND R. L. CHRISTENSEN.

At Pages 3 and 4 of Respondent's brief, he states:
"As is heretofore stated, not only are there
no pleadings or findings to support this award
under the order appealed from as contended by
Appellant, but there are no pleadings, findings
and conclusions to support that part of the order
which Appellant is willing to have stand and to
have enforced against Respondent, which benefits Appellant, fromwhich Respondent takes his
cross appeal, that part of the judgment pertaining to salaries awarded Ruth Barlow and R. L.
Christensen and charged against partnership operations."

6
Appellant cannot understand ho\\· Respon(bt j,
helped because he filed no pleadings and tlH· C:nnl i'i
tered no findings or conclusions to support the CourL
judgment pertaining to salaries awarded to Ruth Barlmr
and R. L. Christensen and charged against the part 11 (,J'ship operations. It was Respondent who asked that said
salaries not be charged against partnership operations
but failed to make any pleadings, findings or conclusions.
The Appellant promptly moved for a new trial and
for amendments of the "Judgment Designated Order''
of November 9, 1964, not only on the ground that the
Court failed to make and enter findings and eonclnsion.'
in support of the judgment, but that the evidPncP wa~ insufficient to support the part of the judgment for Respondent on the matter of awarding him compensation
for "preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership," and the issue had before been decided against
Respondent by a judgment that became final and was
res adjudicata. Respondent has never made a motion
for a new trial or to amend judgment because the judgment was entered against Respondent on the matter of
salaries awarded to Ruth Barlow and R L. Christen~~n.
POINT IV
THE PARTIES DID NOT WAIVE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THE CASE PROPER.

At Page 4 of his brief, Respondent states:
"It is to be noted that the parties waived findings and conclusions in the case proper."
· c1·ted m
· supp oi·t of tlii~
No page of the recor d is
·

7
tatenwnt, and it is untrue. The Judgment Designated
i)rder was signed November 9, 1964 (R. 110). Appellant
on the same day, November 9, 1964, served motion for
new trial on the grounds of failure to file findings and
conclusions (R. 112).
0

POINT V
THE PARTIES DID NOT AGREE TO SUBMIT THE MATTER OF "COMPENSATION TO THE RESPONDENT FOR
HIS HAVING PRESERVED THE MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET
OF THE PARTNERSHIP" AND TO ABIDE ITS DECISION
AFTER THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 1964 WAS ENTERED THEREON.

At Pages 4 and 5 of his brief, Respondent stated:
"'l1he action is an equitable action and contrary to the arguments of Appellant that the
Court heard no evidence to support its order, the
Court did hear evidence and had theretofore indicated to counsel that it intended to award some
compensation to Respondent for his having preserved the mortgage loan asset of the partnership
and having retained jurisdiction of the case at the
request of both counsel, the case having been tried
piece-meal, exercised its equitable powers in entering its order allowing compensation to Respondent for his services rendered. The parties
agreed to submit this phase of the case to the
Court and abide its decision. Therefore, an appeal
from the ruling is not in order nor is the order
appealed from an appealable order."

No page of the record is cited in support of any of
th~se statements.
The statement that " ( 1) the Court did hear evidence and (2) had theretofore indicated to counsel that
it intt·nded to award some compensation to Respondent

8
for his having preserved the mortgage loan asstit of the
partnership, and ( 3) having retained jurisdiction of the
cas~ at the request of both counsel * * * exercising it,
eqmtable powers entered its order allowing comriensation for his services rendered, and ( 4) the parties agreed
to submit this phase of the case to the Court and to
abide its decision" is in each of the four snbclivisio 11 ,
false.
After the judgment of March 12, 1964, (R. 6U-G1)
in which the Court adjudged that "the judgment herein
entered constitutes an accord and satisfaction of all
claims each of the parties has against the other,'' not onl'
word of evidence was introduced nor one word of argument made on the matter of allowing Respondent any
compensations for "preserving the mortgage loan asset
of the business." (R. 245-R. 308).
The Court's equitable powers are to enter judgment
upon proper findings and conclusions supported by
proper evidence. After the Court has entered a judgment which has become final and res adjudirata, the
Court has no power to enter a different judgment, particularly without a motion to amend the judgment and
without any new evidence, findings or conclusion:::.
The Court at no time indicated to counsel for the
Appellant that he intended to award some cornpt·nsalioii
to Respondent for his having "preserved the mortgagi'
loan asset." At thP beginning of the }waring· lwld uu
F'ehrnary 13, 19G4, Respond1:•nt stated:
"VV e further intend to sho\\· * * ;:- "·hile lti'

9
(Respondent) has been devoting his time for the
pres;rv~ti?n of the asset _(mor~gage lo~n asset),
the I lamtiff has been domg his appraisal business (R. 1954)."
From R. 154 to R. 245, the Court took evidence on
i!F' wa1 ter and ruled against the Respondent. (R 245)
1H. liO-G-1-).
Counsel for Appellant never requested the
(onrt to retain jurisdiction of the case.
Certainly the Appellant never agreed to submit the
J11atter of compensation for the Respondent for "pre~erving the mortgage loan asset." There would be no
reason to do so after the Court had ruled that "Neither
party will receive any special compensation for services
during· this interim period." (R 245).
POINT VI
THE RULING WHICH THE COURT MADE IN ITS
ORDER FOR JUDGMENT (Page 245) DID NOT REQUIRE
RESPONDENT'S CONSENT TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF
~IRS. BARLOW AND MR. CHRISTENSEN.

At Page 6 of his brief, Respondent states:
"Appellant points out the fact that the Court
adopted the recommendation of Respondent in
ordering that all income received by either party
from January 1, 1963, to February 1, 1964, should
be distributed in the same manner and as is provided by the partnership agreement and has heretofore been received and distributed, and that
neither partner will receive any compensation for
sPrvices during this interim period. It is evident,
howPver, that when such recommendation was
mad(• hy Respondent's counsel, it was assumed
that the partnership agrePrnent, if invoked, be

10
invoked in all aspects. This \rnuld n·qi:ini thi·
consent of Respondent to the t•~nploy1tH'1it of tho~i·
not employed by the partnerslnp. Thns, Responrl
ent would be protected and would not tw r·onipelled to pay one-half of the salariPs of such
employees. See R. 83."
Respondent cites R. 83 when he no doubt intended
to cite R. 233.
A reading of the discussion which took place hetween the Court and both counsel ( R. 222-24:5) and par
ticularly the comment of Mr. Backman at R. 24-t, will
answer this statement of Respondent. It is apparent
that the last eight lines of the statement are not true.
The matters which the Court and counsel were considering were solely whether the eamings allowed to
each party should be allowed in accordance with the
partnership agreement and the prior practice of the
partnership, and particularly whether Respondent should
be given fifty per cent of the premiums received on insurance policies which had been written with the mortgage loans, and the balance placed in the profit and lo~~
account from which he would receive fifty per cent thereof, or whether the income from the insurance policies
should be divided equally between the partners. In this
matter the Court ruled in favor of the Respondent.
There was no discussion as to whether the consent of the
Respondent to the employment of Mrs. Barlow and Mr.
Christensen need be obtained.

4
\
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POINT VII
THE STATEMENT OF APPELLANT WHICH RESPONDCOULD NOT

ENT CONTENDS MISLED RESPONDENT
HAVE SO MISLED RESPONDENT.

At the bottom of Page 6 and at Page 7 of his brief,
Ri::;pondent states:
''Appellant bases his argument on the ground
tlwt the award made by the Court to Respondent
was at iss1w. It was not made an issue hy any
pleadings bnt was simply an anno1mcement by a
court of equity in its arriving at a settlement of
tlw dispute arising after the Court had rendered
judgnwnt and after counsel for the parties had
requested that the Court retain jurisdiction of
the case to settle the dispute. It is evident that
Appellant ~would take advantage of his having led
Respondent into believing that Appellant's net
income wa8 considerably more than Appellant
later showed his net income to be, and in counsel's
in reliance of such representation and recommending to the Court that which he considered a
fair division of income and expenses, which reconnnendation the Court adopted. Respondent
later found when the true facts were made known,
which facts were much different from those reprPsented by Appellant, that not only would Respondent sustain a substantial loss from participating in any income of Appellant, but Respondent would expose his income to ridiculously high
operating costs resulting in a much different
award than had been anticipated."
It will be noted that the Respondent cites no page
1 pagl·s of the record in support of the misstatements
'\'\ forth above.
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(;oing on, at Page S the Respondent quotes the prior

testimony of Appellant that his income for 1963 and
.January, 1964, would be approximately $28,000.00, with
expenditures of about $10,000.00 against that, and he
goes on to state :
."In reliance on this rPpresentation and assu~mg there would be approximately $20,000.0ll
go ~to th~ partnership account through Appr,]
lant s earnmgs, the above referred to recmnmrndation was made by Respondent's counsel. It is
evident that the Court considered there would bt'
sufficient income realized by Respondent from
Appellant's earnings to offset any additional
award which the Court had theretofore indicated
it would make to Respondent for his services in
preserving the assets of the partnershilJ repn!sented by the mortgage loan business. The Court,
realizing the inequity resulting and to correct
this inequitable situation, stated that it had rPtained jurisdiction of the case and made the
award of $2500.00.
Again, there is nothing in the record to support the
assumption which Respondent has made without foundation. The Court at no time stated that it had retained
jurisdiction of the case.
The Respondent could not rightly a::;surne that there
would be approximately $20,000.00 go into the partnership account through Appellant's earnings. He quotes
Mr. Kiepe as stating that his income for 1963 would be
approximately $28,000.00, with expenditures of about
$10,000.00. Under the partnership agreement and the
practice of the partnership (which the Court ruled woul~
be the basis of any award made for the business of 1963

13
nnu January, 1964), Appellant was entitled to the first
fifty per cent of the income for himself, with a graduated
honns thereon which amounted to $2,365.00 (R. 120).
Thus, without any expenses of operation, the most that
RPspondent could expect would go into the partnership
account through Appellant's earnings of $28,000.00 would
he $H,000.00, less bonus of $2,365.96, or $11,634.04. There
conld b0 no possible basis for expecting $20,000.00 to go
into the partnership account through Appellant's earnings of $28,000.00. Actually, Appellant's earnings were
$32,120.00 (R. 242) instead of $28,000.00, and the amount
going into the partnership account through his earnings
would be $13,695.00 instead of $11,634.00. The amount
which would go into the partnership account for the
same period from Respondent's earnings would be

$8,091.81.

The Court did not state "that he had retained jurisdiction of the case and made the award of $2500.00." The
Re::>pondent cites no reference to the record and there
i~ nothing in the record to support this statement.
At the bottom of Page 8, the Respondent states:
"The evidence shows the difficulty Respondent faced in compelling Appellant to render an
accounting of his earnings as ordered by the Court
and in having the Appellant each time the matter
was brought before the Court furnish a different
aecount, finally forcing the Respondent to obtain
an order to show cause."
Again, Respondent fails to cite any page of the
:PeoHi in support of this misstatement. The matter was
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only brought before the Court once. The Appellant ev.
plained that some of the accounting rendered by hi~
varied because collections had been made in· the 1·nterun
·
between statements, which necessitated a revision of the
figures in the accounting (R. 248). Respondent was not
forced to obtain an order to show cause any more than
the Appellant was forced to obtain an order to shO\r
cause against the Respondent.
POINT VIII
RESPONDENT PARTICIPATED IN APPELLANT'S AP
PRAISAL INCOME DURING 1963 THE SAME AS HE DID
PRIOR THERETO.

Respondent at Page 9 of his brief states:
"Appellant argues at Page 20 of his brief
that Respondent took care of the mortgage loan
asset for many years before 1963 but received no
special compensation therdor in addition to hi~
fees for making loans and commissions on insurance written with the loans. We point out, how(~ver, that Respondent was, during that period of
time, participating in income from the appraisal
business of Appellant of which approximately 50
per cent went into the partnership income which
was divided equally between the parties after the
proportionate share of expenses has been charged
against this income."
It now appears that Respondent admits that no
special compensation was ever given to the Respondent
for "taking care of the mortgage loan asset for many
years before 1963" but states that the Respondent during that period of time "participated in income from the
appraisal business of Appellant of which approximately
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fifty per eent went into partnership income, which was
chi<leu equally between the parties after the proportion-

atr share of expenses had been charged against this
income." During 1963 the same was true. Fifty per
cent of Appellant's income from the appraisal business
,1ent into partnership income, except for the bonus paid
to him. The same was true of the Respondent's income.
ffowe>vPr, instead of earning a bonus of only $908.19 as
in 1963, Mr. LeCheminant in prior years earned suffir:ient income that there was paid to him bonuses thereon
as follows:
1959

$4,046.34
1960
1,676.39
1,862.62
1961 ······························
1,848'.58 ( R. 294:)
1962 ································
POINT IX
THE PARTIES DID NOT SEEK THE AID OF THE
COURT TO MAKE A DIVISION OF INCOME AND EXPENSES DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1963 to FEBRUARY 1, 1964 AFTER THE COURT'S JUDGMENT OF MARCH
12 WAS ENTERED.

At page 16 Respondent states:

"Neither party to the action had by any
pleadings asked for a determination of the rights
of the parties during the thirteen-month period
subsequent to the cutting off date of the partnership as of February 1, 1963. When the parties
were unable to agree on an equitable division of
income and expenses during this thirteen-month
peL'ioJ, the parties sought the aid of the Court
to settle this controversv which the Court did and
it resulted in the order .herein appealed from."

16
Again, Appellant states this statement is wholh·
false. As stated at R. 154, before any evidence was intr;.
duced into the hearing of February 13, 196.t, counsel for
Respondent stated:
"We furt~er intend to show that during thP
past years pnor to the date of the dissolution of
the partr.iership, February 1, 1963, the Defendant
has earned on the mortgage loan and insuranrP
business which Plaintiff is now receiving, and Jw
has preserved that asset for the partners ~ " •
and I can appreciate that it may develop into a
most difficult situation for the Court to have to
determine what would be fair and just in this
matter."
As before stated, the Court then proceeded to hear
91 pages of evidence and argument on this matter (R.
152-245) and rendered its decision against the Rm;pondent, and never thereafter heard one word of evidence
nor one word of argument on the matter of consideration for "preserving the mortgage loan asset." Again,
Respondent fails to cite a page of the record in support
of his statement.
POINT X
THE AMOUNT THAT BOTH PARTIES WILL BE ENTITLED TO CANNOT BE DETERMINED UNTIL THE
COURT HAS PASSED UPON THE ITEMS OF THIS APPEAL.

At Page 22 of his brief, Respondent states:
"The Court erred in its finding that CrossA ppellant is entitled to receive the sum of $1~,433.22 out of the cash on hand of $28,723.98. Thii
item results in the assumption that the cro:o;s ~l;j
peal will be favorable to Cross-Appellant on a

17
poinh; relied upon, in which case the award to
Cross-Appellant should be $20,093.22 and not the
sum of $16,433.22 awarded to Cross-Appellant by
the order appealed from."
lt is true that the calculations of the final amounts

to be awarded to the parties must await the decision of

the Court on the other matters argued in Appellant's
brief and Respondent's brief.
POINT XI
AN AW ARD OF A BONUS OF $535.00 TO EACH OF
THE PARTIES WILL BE OF NO VALUE TO EITHER PARTY.

At Page 10 of Respondent's brief, referring to the
award of a bonus of $535.00 to each of the parties in
the judgment of November 9, 1964, Respondent states:
"This point is predicated entirely upon an
accounting principal which the Court considered.
Appellant had, according to the accounting submitted, received his revised bonus over and above
the fifty per cent awarded in the original judgment and the Court, in order to place both parties
on the same bonus basis, awarded this item to
Respondent."
Appellant asks what accounting principle is Respondent talking about 1
The bonus for the Appellant and the Respondent
\\'as calculated by the certified public accountant iN ac1'ordanee with the judgment of the Court and resulted
n the following bonuses: To Appellant, $2,365.96; to
H~spondent, $908.19. (R. 120). Neither party will benefit a dollar by awarding each a bonus of $535.00 as pro1
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vided in the judgment (R. 110). The Court did not
order a bonus of $535.00, or any other amount, paid to
the partners (R. 107-R. 108).
CONCLUSION
The Appellant again submits that the law and evidence require that :
1. The award of $2500.00 to Respondent for "pre-

serving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership" be
set aside.
2. That the bonus of $535.00 to each partner
aside.

f: set

3. That the portion of the judgment which fixes
the amount of credits to which Respondent is entitled
and which fixes the amount of refunds due Appellant
and the balance credit due Respondent be set aside, and
that this matter be returned to the trial court for further
consideration.
4. Appellant's motion to amend the judgment of
March 12, 1964, nunc pro tune be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
MOFFAT, IVERSON AND
ELG9'REN
, .·
/. ,/7

I

"---'Z, ~~
{'

By.. --~~k .... .-.-: ..................-!I
,/
J. Grant Iverson
/Attorneys for Appellant
/''

